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Abstract
Information technology can link geographically separated people and help them locate interesting or
compatible resources.  Although these attributes have the potential to bridge gaps and unite communities,
they also have the potential to fragment interaction and divide groups by leading people to spend more time
on special interests and by screening out less preferred contact.  This paper introduces precise measures of
“balkanization” then develops a model of individual knowledge profiles and community affiliation.  These
factors suggest conditions under which improved access, search, and screening might either balkanize or
integrate interaction.  As IT capabilities continue to improve, policy choices we make could put us on more
or less attractive paths.
1. INTRODUCTION:  THE EMERGING GLOBAL VILLAGE?
With the explosive growth in Internet connections worldwide, networked communication has the potential to shrink geographic
distances and facilitate information exchange among people of various backgrounds.  Telecommunications policy in the US
— and other countries — resolves to extend access to all levels of society, assuming that this will foster greater information
exchange while boosting economic growth ( NTIA 1993).  Empowered by information technology such as search engines and
automatic filters, IT users are spending more of their waking hours plugged into the Internet, choosing to interact with
information sources customized to their individual interests.  No longer limited to sources or companions in their geographic
neighborhoods, these users presage an interactive world without borders.
What, then, are the social and economic consequences of hooking up the next billion users?  Does the emergence of a global
information infrastructure imply the emergence of the global village — a virtual community of neighbors freed of geographic
constraints?
In this paper, we show that an emerging global village represents only one outcome from a range of possibilities.  It is also
possible that improving communications access through emerging technology will fragment society and balkanize interactions.
In particular, we focus on the potential balkanization of preferences, including social, intellectual and economic affiliations,
analogous to geographic regions.  Just as separation in physical space, or basic balkanization, can divide geographic groups,
we find that separation in virtual space, or “cyberbalkanization” can divide special interest groups.  In certain cases, the latter
can be more fragmented.  We introduce several formal indices of balkanization then show both algebraically and graphically
the conditions under which these indices will rise or fall with different levels of access.
The general argument is fairly simple.  If IT provides a lubricant that allows for the satisfaction of preferences against the
friction of geography, then more IT can imply that people increasingly fulfill their preferences.  A preference for contact that
is more focused than contacts available locally leads to narrower interactions.  Thus local heterogeneity can give way to virtual
homogeneity as communities coalesce across geographic boundaries.
We do not argue that increased balkanization must result from increased connectivity.  On the contrary, we believe that the
Internet has enormous potential to elevate the nature of human interaction.  Indeed, we find that if preferences favor diversity,
the same mechanisms might reduce balkanization.  However, our analysis also indicates that, other factors being equal, all that
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This is under the generous assumption that one could access and read a page every ten seconds, eight hours a day, 3651
days a year and that no pages needed to be revisited as their content changed.
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is required for increased balkanization is that preferred interactions are more focused than existing interactions.  Thus, we
examine critically  the claim that a global village is the inexorable result of increased connectivity.
Bounded rationality, a limit on the human capacity for calculation (Simon 1957), also promotes balkanization.  As IT eliminates
geographical constraints on interaction, bounded rationality imposes a new constraint. Improved technologies have increased
information transmission speeds and bandwidth across all distances except the last twelve inches — between the computer
monitor and the brain.  The amount of data one can absorb is bounded, regardless of how fast it scrolls across the screen.  The
Internet can provide access to millions of other users and a wide range of knowledge sources, but no one can interact with all
of them.  As of May 1996, the AltaVista search engine had indexed more that 33 million articles and web pages.  It would take
over five years to read just the new listings added each month.   Even if people wished to do so, creating a global community1
which depends on individuals consuming vast amounts of disparate and topically unrelated information would simply be
infeasible.
The practical implication of bounded rationality in this context is that a citizen of cyberspace still has a finite set of “neighbors”
with whom he or she can meaningfully interact, but these neighbors can now be chosen based on criteria other than geography.
As Jarvenpaa and Ives suggest, “advanced information and communication systems define the boundaries of these new
organizations” (1994, p. 26).  Yet, the number of neighbors with whom one interacts is unlikely to exceed a few dozen in a
typical day; even in a lifetime, few people have significant relationships with more than a few thousand others.  As long as
human information processing capabilities are bounded, electronic media are unlikely to dramatically change this total.  When
geography no longer narrows interaction, people are able to select their acquaintances by other criteria such as common
interests, status, economic class, academic discipline, or ethnic group.  The result can easily be a greater balkanization along
dimensions which matter far more than geography.
The geographic region from which this paper draws its title is named for a Turkish word meaning “mountains.”  Physical
barriers imposed by numerous mountain ranges — the Cincar, the Radusa, and the Vitorog — are partially responsible for
ethnic fragmentation in the former Yugoslavia.  While the Internet renders these geographic impediments irrelevant, a visit
to Usenet groups such as soc.culture.bosna-herzgvna and soc.culture.croatia indicates that Bosnian, Serbian, and Croatian
electronic communities remain as divided as their physical counterparts.  In this world-without-walls, historical biases stand
in for  geographic barriers and limit integration just as effectively.
Because the Internet makes it easier to find like-minded individuals, it can facilitate and strengthen fringe communities that
have a common ideology but are dispersed geographically.  Thus, particle physicists, oenophiles, Star Trek fans, and members
of militia groups have used the Internet to find each other, swap information and stoke each others’ passions.  In many cases,
their heated dialogues might never have reached critical mass as long as geographic separation diluted them to a few parts per
million.  Once like-minded individuals locate each other, their subsequent interactions can further polarize their views or even
ignite calls-to-action.
The Internet can also facilitate the de facto secession of individuals or groups from their geographic neighborhoods. Because
time is limited, spending more time interacting with online communities necessarily means spending less time interacting with
geographic communities or even family members.  For instance, while Jose Soriano founded a Peruvian network “to minimize
the gap between the information haves and information have-nots,” the network also facilitates local geographic secession.
Psychologist Manuel Molla Madeueno, a typical user, reports that “I use the Internet to read psychology magazines and articles
and notes that are posted on the psychology bulletin board.  The only problem is that I’ve become obsessed with what I can
do on the Internet and I’m spending all my free time there” (Sims 1996).   As Mr. Madeueno becomes more of a member of
the community of academic psychologists, he inevitably becomes less of a member of some other community such as his
Peruvian village, at least in terms of time spent interacting. The Internet has apparently led him to spend less time interacting






A table of precise interpretations for our constructs appears in a glossary of symbols at the end of this article.2
In this paper, we assume that “negative” knowledge does not exist, thus Cos(Θ ) is non-negative.3 ij
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Existing literature provides useful indices of “centrality” and “vulnerability” in network structures (Alstyne 1996; Freeman
1979; Malone and Smith 1988) which help measure how well-connected or pivotal individuals are within their networks.  Social
network literature also identifies blocks of related ties within interconnected communities (White, Boorman and Breiger 1976)
and describes the effects of weak ties (Granovetter 1973) or the absence of ties, i.e., “structural holes” (Burt 1993), on
information flows.  A formal model of dyadic or pairwise communication also shows integration occurring as a result of face-
to-face interaction and print communication (Kaufer and Carley 1993).  Complementing this literature, our research provides
a model of shared information and community cohesion when multiple simultaneous interactions are possible.  It also provides
specific new measures of fragmentation. We use these indices to examine theoretical implications of changing
interconnectivity, searching, and screening.
2. MODELING PEOPLE AND RESOURCES IN THE GLOBAL VILLAGE
To facilitate our inquiry into questions of balkanization, we construct a model of information resources and introduce measures
of fragmentation.  By “balkanization,” we mean the degree to which resources exist as disconnected islands within a larger
population.   Since fragmentation may have different meanings, we measure three different types: group membership,2
communication distance, and information resource concentration.  Let the agents be enumerated as i, j 0 {1, 2, 3, ... N} where
N is the size of the total population.  Then we can say that access A improves as it increases from 1 to N and that A/N
represents the fraction of the population any given agent i can reach.  Also, each agent has C channels, the maximum number
of people from the population he or she can contact simultaneously assuming bounded rationality.  With no constraints, an
agent could interact with all N people but with a constraint they can interact with no more than C even if access exceeds
capacity, A>C.
Adopting the convention of an information resource as a knowledge base represented by k , we can associate knowledge withit
individual agents i in terms of both a type t 0 {1, 2, 3, ... T} and relative amount k.  Importantly, this also allows us to
distinguish access by type and to characterize knowledge profiles by agent.  Let the knowledge profile P  of agent i be a vectori
of how much he knows about each topic, P  = [k , k , ... k .  Each agent can thus be mapped to a unique point in “knowledgei  i1  i2   iT
space” which is analogous to his or her geographic location.   If an agent starts with only a single type of information and has
knowledge profile P  = [0, 0, ... k , ... 0], then allowing access to an agent j who has knowledge of a different topic s cani     it
provide agent i with a profile of P  = [0, 0, k , k , ... 0].  Then, if k  is the total knowledge of a given type, i.e., k  = i    js  it       t          t
we can describe the total knowledge existing in a population as K = [k , k , ... k ].  For simplicity, we do not require agents1  2   T
with the same type of knowledge to know exactly the same information.  Thus agents with overlapping information can connect
with a net gain in resources.  Under these assumptions, increasing access has the attractive property of increasing an agent’s
knowledge profile towards full information where || P  ||/|| K || = 1.  The magnitude of the knowledge profile indicates how closei
an individual agent comes to accessing the full information available to a society of individuals.
Shared Knowledge Index:  Using this terminology, we now have the ability to calculate the degree of “similarity” between
knowledge profiles P  and P  represented as the cosine of Θ , the angle between them.i  j      ij
Definition:  The “similarity,” S  between two individuals in “knowledge space” is given by:ij
S  = Cos(Θ ) = P  . P  / ||P  || ||P  ||.ij  ij   i  j  i  j
Cos(Θ ) approaches 1 as profiles become more similar and approaches 0 as they grow farther apart.ii
3
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This index is a generalization of a measure of two-way overlap appearing in Donath (1995).4
Note that indices of “integration” could just as easily be represented as 1-β.5
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Balkanized Affiliations:  Based on our definitions of knowledge profiles, we can also define an index of how much agents’
affiliations overlap.  An agent, who starts out with resources k  and has an affiliation with type t, can increase affiliations byit
gaining access to other types.  For an index of balkanized affiliation, we want a measure that decreases when communities
overlap and that increases with the number of separate communities.  Let the number of members affiliated with a community
of type t be given by M(t) so that we can now derive a metric of balkanization.
Definition:  The “index of balkanized affiliation,” β  for a population is given by:A
4
This index ranges from a low of 0 if every individual is a member of every community to a high of 1 if every community is
closed and shares no members with any other community.  The more diverse an agent’s affiliations, the more he or she lowers
the index of balkanized affiliation.
Several propositions will draw attention to different aspects of balkanization, thus we sometimes require distinct measures of
group resources, communication, and membership.  The similarity measure S  = Cos(Θ ) provides an index of comparativeij  ij
individual access.  The balkanization measure β  indexes the diversity of group interactions among members of a society.  TwoA
additional measures, presented in Appendix A, complement these two:  β  refers to communications and β  to informationC     I
resources.   Although they can move independently, results tend to be qualitatively similar so we focus on S  and β .  This5 ij  A
collection of indices provides a way to compare both individuals and groups within a society based on the same constructs of
access and affiliation.
3. GEOGRAPHY UNBOUND
As communication costs fall generally, the cost of connecting individual agents also falls.  If the costs are too high, no two
agents communicate; if the costs are negligible, all agents can communicate.  With IT costs falling dramatically,
interconnectivity is likely to increase (Malone, Yates and Benjamin 1987).  One possible progression is a move from
completely isolated agents to completely interconnected agents as in Figure 1.  We use these to illustrate the indices of
balkanization.
Figure 1.A   Figure 1.B    Figure 1.C Figure 1.D Figure 1.E
Figure 1.  Connectivity levels increase as communication costs fall from left to right
This example conforms to popular ideas on the emergence of networked infrastructure.  When communication costs are
prohibitive, these twelve agents operate in isolation with incomplete knowledge of global information as in Figure 1.A.  As
communication costs fall, clusters of communication emerge allowing agents to share information and gain a less fragmented
understanding.  This is shown in intermediate frames.  Once costs become negligible, a fully connected community emerges
permitting everyone access to full knowledge of events as in Figure 1.E.  From left to right, knowledge profiles grow from their
Alstyne and Brynjolfsson
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greatest fragmentation to their least fragmentation while community “balkanization” decreases.  Different agents, represented
by different shapes may have different information requirements or communication interests.  These potential preferences will
motivate subsequent observations on how much communication actually occurs.  The basic intuition, however, is shown
formally in Proposition 1.
Proposition 1:  Without bounded rationality constraints, global access minimizes balkanization.  That is β = 0 and agents’A
knowledge profiles are the same, S  = 1.ij
Proof:  For a formal derivation of this and subsequent propositions, please see the mathematical appendix. (Appendix  B).
The table below shows the data for S  = Cos(Θ ) and for β  using the graphs from Figure 1.ij  ij    A
Index Figure 1.A Figure 1.B Figure 1.C Figure 1.D Figure 1.E
Average (S ) .27 .55 .77 .84 1ij
βA 1 .75 .35 .17 0
In this example, there are four agents of each type so their knowledge profiles overlap somewhat in Figure 1.A.  If there were
twelve separate types, the similarity measure would be 0.  By Figure 1.E, all agents have access to society’s information so
knowledge profiles are identical.  Communities of types in Figure 1.A, however, share no members in common so $  indicatesA
complete segregation.  Once the types are completely interconnected, this index falls to 0.
The decline in balkanization associated with the improved access of this simple model is consistent with the common view that
telecommunications, and the Internet in particular, can help foster the emergence of a global village.
4. RATIONALITY BOUND
The trouble with simply eliminating geographic constraints lies in assuming the absence of any other constraints such as
bounded rationality or vetoed interaction.  Physical connectivity does not imply logical connectivity when either party at one
end of a connection is either too preoccupied or otherwise unwilling to interact.  In practice, limitations on interaction exist
due to (1) cognitive capacity constraints, (2) missing or unshared vocabulary, e.g., medical terminology, (3) insufficient
bandwidth, e.g., even video-conferencing may provide insufficient context for first meetings, and (4) lack of trust, e.g.,
Japanese business relationships may require bonding time to establish reputations.
Unconstrained communication can actually be burdensome.  During one police investigation, an Internet posting of a request
for information resulted in too many false leads during a time-sensitive abduction (Leslie 1995).  Netiquette also addresses
wasteful communication.  Newsgroup readers actively discourage posting irrelevant material — off-topic news, solicitations,
personal attacks — partly because of the time and nuisance costs it imposes on the community.
Since time and rationality are finite, agents prioritize their connections based on a combination of access to and preferences
for certain types.  The figure below depicts expanding geographic access.  Nearer agents are more likely contacts as are agents
of a preferred type.
Figure 2.  Darker thicker lines imply higher probabilities of a connection viewed from the
perspective of a type at the center of expanding access circles.
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In these examples, we follow Kaufer and Carley (1993) and show preferences as an affinity for similar types.  This is6
primarily helpful as illustration and is inessential to our main findings.  Later examples will show how preferences for
dissimilar types can give analogous results.
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As access expands, more agents become possible contacts.  The agent shown near the center prefers to connect to like types
if they happen to be within reach.  Characterizing this yields Proposition 2.
Proposition 2:  Virtual communities increase balkanization relative to geographic communities given bounded rationality,
C<T, and a preference for similar  types.6
The figures below illustrate geographic connections converting to type connections after agents gain global access.
   Figure 3.A      Figure 3.B
Figure 3.  As geographic access improves, agents seek preferred types
In Figure 3.A, access is strictly local and bounded by geography so agents form small communities with fairly uniform
knowledge access across types.  Figure 3.B  shows global access; like types have located one another and formed tightly knit
communities.  Interconnections between communities have fallen and resources are more concentrated.  The balkanization
indices in this example show that, for twelve agents and three types, the average Cos(Θ ) declines from .77 to .27 indicatingij
that profiles diverge and β  rises from .35 to 1, indicating that overlap has fallen among communities.A
Geography imposes an unavoidable heterogeneity.  Adam Smith’s butcher, brewer, and baker rubbed shoulders in a local town
of physical neighbors.  A virtual community of like-minded citizens, however, might be entirely homogeneous.  The baker
might learn from and contribute to the collected information on baking, indulging his passion for learning more and more about
breads even as he learns less and less about meat and drink.  As virtual citizens leave their physical neighborhoods behind, they
inadvertently withdraw their contributions to their physical locales.  Increasingly unaware of each other’s communities,
specialized vocabularies, and nouveau contributions, the butcher, the brewer, and the baker might each provide better meat,
drink, or bread individually but lose the ability to provide a balanced meal.
This is not without the caveat that incentives can coax groups into working together.  If there are benefits to cooperation, then
IT is likely to facilitate interaction among them.  A caterer, for example, might contract with providers from each community.
Without geographic constraints, incentives can push interaction toward fragmentation or integration, which raises the issues
of how incentives operate and of which pathways emerge.
Evidence suggests that better communications can strengthen interactions within special interest groups.  In describing what
might characterize the emerging “Global Village,” McLuhan and Powers (1989) nevertheless recognize the power of satellite
technology to aid “super-regionalisms” and “separatisms” such as the Parti Quebeçois in Canada.  As an historical example,
the telephone strengthened affiliation among teenage peer groups (Sproull and Kiesler 1991).  In the field of economics, the
number of out-of-state and out-of-country coauthorships in four top journals grew from 4.6% in the 1960s to 27.6% in the 1990s
(Gaspar and Glaeser 1996).  Similar evidence appears to hold for academia in general:
Alstyne and Brynjolfsson
Interview with Edward Mabry, communications researcher at University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee (Leslie 1995).7
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Historically, the strength of an academic department rested with its resident faculty.  Now it depends on the
extent to which each faculty member is interconnected with other professionals — worldwide — pursuing
similar interests...  We now have electronic research teams and electronic water coolers.  This drastically
changes — weakens, in my opinion — indigenous workplace relationships and affects workplace
cohesiveness.7
Contact expansion is also a factor that might influence balkanization.  The Internet has the attractive property that a person
might communicate with a very large group of associates, and this might integrate the population.  For example, newsgroups
and chat rooms have few, if any, physical limitations on participation.  Broader participation will unbalkanize resources and
groups insofar as more people choose to access the same information and insofar as information flows across the boundaries
of distinct groups.  These represent important gains from increased connectivity.  There are, however, two important
qualifications.
The first qualification is that if broader participation is restricted to members of the same community then information resources
are less fragmented (i.e., β  falls) but intergroup fragmentation remains unchanged (i.e., β  stays constant).  People might alsoI        A
find that the sizes of their groups increase but that the number of group memberships they hold remains relatively constant.
By analogy to journal publication, the variety of choices and the number of subscribers might increase but the number of
simultaneous subscriptions held by individuals might not increase much.  Due to bounded rationality, the median subscriber
base might even fall as mass publication gives way to niche publication.  This appears to be a strategy of many increasingly
focused, or even personalized, net “e-zines” and news feeds.
Second, participating in a group is not the same as interacting with all of a group’s members.  The number of subscribers to
most newsgroups substantially exceeds the number of people who actually post messages.  Joining a new community shortens
communications distance (i.e., β  falls) only if this establishes new and shorter paths and it homogenizes information profilesC
(i.e., β  falls) only if members actually communicate.  Universal participation is unlikely to imply universal broadcast.  NoiseA
and confusion would likely result.  Expressed differently, as a group gets larger, the fraction of members who post
communications probably declines after some critical point.  In network organizations, for example, sociologists have
recognized that as the number of in-group ties increase, the number of out-group ties tends to decrease due to affinity relations
and economizing on time and effort (Baker 1993) — an empirical finding which supports the possibility of fragmentation.
We consider capabilities enhancement a second order effect relative to the first order effect of improving communications reach
and search capability.  Although bounded rationality constraints motivate Proposition 2, expanding capabilities to relax this
constraint can leave intact the basic balkanization result, as long as reach and search capabilities improve more rapidly.
Graphically, this can be shown in the following manner.
Figure 4.A   Figure 4.B
Figure 4.  Increasing channel capacity does not necessarily decrease  balkanized affiliations
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This is not to suggest that nothing has changed.  Communication paths are (slightly) shorter and information is (slightly)8
less concentrated implying that β  and β  have fallen.  This draws attention to the importance of multiple measures.  AppendixC  I
B presents an example in which indices even move in opposite directions.
ACLU v. Reno #96-963.  Ruling of 6/11/96; §88.9
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In this example, agents use their additional connections to reach additional members of the same community.   This leads to8
the following observation:
Proposition 3:  Under global access, relaxing the bounded rationality constraint C does not reduce balkanized affiliation unless
agents seek information outside their original topic areas.  Let β N and Θ N represent new indices after expanding agents’A   ij
capabilities.  If agents connect to members of the same community, then new indices are unchanged and β N = β  and œ i, j,A   A
Θ N = Θ .ij   ij
New channels might reduce balkanization if agents use their added capabilities to reach outside their original communities.
In the example above, however, channels have increased by 50% but all agents use their additional resources to communicate
with previously unreached members of their existing communities.  Resource fragmentation falls (β  changes from .81 to .67)Ι
but groups are no more integrated than before.  Each agent effectively deepens his or her knowledge of a given topic area.
Indices of balkanized affiliation remain unchanged.
5. THE PREFERENCES THAT BIND
Another feature of Proposition 2 is that agents exhibit fairly strong preferences:  they prefer to associate exclusively with agents
of like types.  Our fourth result relaxes this condition (some agents might prefer intentional randomness) and shows that even
weak preferences can lead to similar results.  In fact, unless agents are indifferent to their connections or seek greater diversity
than is locally available, a population with global access will generally increase on measures of balkanization.  We formalize
this below.
Proposition 4:  Mild affinity preferences increase balkanization.  If an agent prefers more associations of one type than an
average sample from the local population, then balkanization increases.  Stronger preferences lead to greater balkanization.
In Figure 5, we hold access constant at a global level and vary preferences.  Initially, agents enjoy connecting with everyone
— there is an equal (2/3) probability that a connection reaches any type.  In the second frame, agents have committed one of
their channels to a like type leaving a smaller (1/3) chance of connecting on the remaining channel.  In the third frame, agents
have allocated both channels to like types reducing the chances of intercommunity interaction to zero.
Modeling this outcome depends on the ease of long distance dialog and the loss of serendipitous interaction, two features which
are increasingly in evidence today.  In ruling against certain provisions of the Communications Decency Act, for example, the
presiding judges stated in their findings of fact:  “Unlike traditional media. . .communications over the Internet do not ‘invade’
an individual’s home or appear on one’s computer screen unbidden.  Users seldom encounter content ‘by accident’.”9
Index Figure 5.A Figure 5.B Figure 5.C
Average (S ) 0.69 0.44 0.25ij
$ 0.49 0.84 1A
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Nor does the result depend on a preference for similar types.  If preferences are such that A will only speak to B who will10
only speak to C who will only speak to A, then communications deadlock.  Likewise, mutual preferences for contact between
pairs (A, B) and (C, D) can divide the community into two blocks.  In both cases, a preference for dissimilar types can
balkanize interactions.
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Figure 5.A     Figure 5.B Figure 5.C
Figure 5.  Under global access, balkanization increases as agents change from enjoying any
connection, to preferring at least one common type, to preferring only common types
If individuals can choose their content, contacts, and connections, then emphasizing preferred communities can balkanize
interactions.  Although Figure 5 shows only one type of commitment, this effect does not depend on a preference for a single
type.  If, for example, a person chooses to interact with a dozen communities when serendipitous geographic interaction would
have led to several dozen, then the breadth of exposure to novel information is likely to fall.   The key point is that if the10
distribution of tastes differs from the distribution of types in the local population, then technologically lowered search costs
will cause higher levels of balkanization.  With bounded rationality, any preference for membership in virtual communities
that is more concentrated than representative geographic samples will reduce affiliations with less favored communities — the
stronger the preferences, the stronger the balkanization.  Proposition 4 has powerful implications because it suggests that
geography only needs to be more heterogeneous than tastes in order for the lifting of geographic constraints to balkanize
interactions.
Balkanization as an outcome, however, is by no means certain.  If preferences are weak or tastes favor diversity then the action
of preferences can lower balkanization.  In other words, if geography is less heterogeneous than tastes, greater connectivity
implies moving from right to left in Figure 5.  This gives rise to the following observation:
Corollary 4:  With greater connectivity, a taste for randomness or diversity unbalkanizes interaction.
This corollary simply restates the previous conclusion with tastes running in the opposite direction.  The Internet can, in fact,
lend itself to experimentation as when people enter into multi user-domains (MUDs) and alter their virtual personalities,
genders, and behaviors (Turkle 1995).  Differences can also attract (Kaufer and Carley 1993).  The model and metrics are
robust and they can illustrate movement both toward and away from balkanization.  Which effect dominates depends on the
aggregate distribution of preferences. Narrower preferences balkanize while broader preferences unbalkanize interactions.
6. ENDOGENOUS PREFERENCES:  HYPER-SPECIALIZATION?
Additionally, preferences need not remain static; the desire for affiliation with a particular group can increase or decrease over
time.  With geographic constraints, the degree of heterogeneity, noise, and serendipity implies that actual interactions have
the more diverse and jagged profile shown in Figure 6.A.  An agent with access to IT can more easily match a desired profile
by searching for people with similar interests, by using searching and filtering to suggest relevant information and by using
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Less focused interaction, or negative feedback, might also occur if communities experience satiation.  If their interests11
become more diffuse over time, the progression could move from right to left in Figure 6.
US Patent 5,515,098.12
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IT initially aids search and filtration as in Figures 6.A to 6.B, but agents may subsequently acquire new tastes or sharpen their
preferences.  The progression from Figure 6.B to 6.C illustrates the condition of positive feedback:  an affinity for a particular
topic leads an agent to seek either more information from or more solidarity with the community focused on that topic.
Communications research suggests that “what you know depends on whom you know and who you know depends on whom
you meet” (Sproull and Kiesler 1991, p.11).  This can make knowledge profiles path dependent and it also opens the door to
information feedback.  Historically, positive feedback is damped by geography and unfiltered interaction.  Communication
technology, search engines, and message filters, however, encourage positive feedback.   With “perfect” filtering and positive11
feedback, the only stopping point is a topic singularity as appearing in Figure 6.C.
Figure 6.  Reducing noise and positive feedback can concentrate contact
The initial effect of IT might be to reduce noise, moving contacts from 6.A to 6.B, while the subsequent effect could be to
encourage specialization, moving contacts from 6.B to 6.C.  The second shift might represent a political dabbler becoming
focused on a special interest group or an oenophile graduating from an interest in wines to a preference for fine burgundies
only.  Empirical findings appear to support these observations.  In illustrating a theory of communication ecology as mutually
defining agents, context, and transmissions, Kaufer and Carley cite several studies in which contact and shared information
exhibited a reciprocal relationship.  A study of writing students, for example, found a positive correlation between their patterns
of interaction and emerging pockets of consensus.  Another study found that employees’ similarity, shared information, and
proximity predicted their social interactions.  Feedback between interaction and shared information also appears to explain
differences in observed cohesiveness of certain religious groups.
Recent technology provides a far higher level of control over interaction and contact filtering.  Control exists at the message
level where previously it extended only to the interpersonal level.  Moreover, filtering and screening may take place on behalf
of individuals with or without their foreknowledge and consent.  The New York Times will shortly deliver customized news via
Netscape’s web browser and a patent has recently been issued for software which customizes personalized advertisements over
cable channels.   Advertising and news stories can be targeted to the level of word choice both to spark interest and to12
penetrate filters designed to screen unwanted contact.  IT might therefore lead to more focused interaction through the action
of choices people make for themselves and the action of choices made for them. Moreover, if preferences for new information
are a function of past information or contacts, then an agent’s preferences and connections can become highly path dependent.
Small changes early in the evolution of a community can radically affect their character.
Many communities offer examples of increasingly narrow focus  and specialization.  Numerous (most?) academic disciplines,
in fact, have progressed to the point where the specialized vocabulary that facilitates interactions within the community hinders
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interaction across communities.  Indeed, Kuhn has observed that a widening gulf “separates the professional scientist from his
colleagues in other fields” (1970, p. 21).  Specialists in branches of mathematics other than algebraic geometry, for example,
have difficulty following a recent proof of Fermat’s last theorem.  Splinter groups of the ICIS community now include WITS,
WISE, IFPUG and others.  Differentiation and inbreeding among communities has progressed to the point where expertise can
mean “knowing more and more about less and less.”  As IT improves filtering, tailoring, segmenting, and searching, the more
global network becomes the less local village.
7. FROM BALKANIZATION TO STRATIFICATION
The principles which govern balkanization across types also hold within types if sufficient differentiation exists to distinguish
one classification from another of the same type.  Quality can represent one such axis of differentiation.  Given quality
differences — analogous to different types — the same balkanization phenomena can occur.  Associations can form among
high, middle, and low quality tiers inducing stratification.  As a twist on balkanization, this leads to our final proposition.
Proposition 5:  Quality differentiation in virtual communities leads to stratification.
In the figures below, icons represent a single type in which superior resources interact with one another.
The same community affiliation mechanisms apply.  This interpretation emphasizes one novel dynamic, however, implicit in
earlier discussions.  Agents at a source might wish to affiliate with agents at a destination but if agents at the destination have
already committed their channels, the destination community is closed.  Veto power at a destination can balkanize communities
despite preferences for diversity at a source.  The publisher of an electronic newsletter, for example, argues “I hate to sound
undemocratic, but if you’re going to have valuable discussion, you have to limit it to people with valuable knowledge. The
beginners can have their beginner’s groups” (Chao 1995).
Figure 7.A Figure 7.B
Figure 7.  These figures, which are analogs of Figures 3.A and 3.B, show stratification within one type
New information technologies also can exclude as well as enfranchise as with encryption, intranets, private mailing lists, and
firewalls.  With respect to quality, agents might wish to connect to others agents’ higher grade resources  but find no
connections available.  Agents in the top tier of an information pyramid might therefore benefit disproportionately from global
access.  Any initial advantage from owning a quality resource grows because it gains an agent possible entry into an otherwise
closed community.   Importantly, however, closure occurs not from any bias against one group but from a preference for13
another.  There is an implicit competition between choices for interaction only because a limitation on choices means that a
decision to include one option results in the exclusion of another.
The combination of stratification and balkanization are depicted in Figure 8.  Members of communities A and B might be


















Figure 8.A Figure 8.B Figure 8.C
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which are geographically diverse but balkanize with respect to topic area (8.B).  Finally, 8.C shows how adding other axes of
differentiation creates an opportunity for further fragmentation.  Such axes can include, for example, subspecialization within
an existing discipline.
Focusing interaction can homogenize intra-action but at the cost of separating groups.  Figure 8.C, in particular, shows how
one model of community interactions could place near geographic neighbors in different topic camps.  If IT shrinks distance,
spending time “abroad” can imply neighbors might become strangers and measures of knowledge overlap might fall with rising
balkanization of communities.
8. CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS:  SHOULD WE CARE ABOUT BALKANIZATION?
In this paper, we have defined measures of balkanization, we have developed a model of possible affiliation based on individual
preferences, and we have used these tools to explore possible theoretical implications of changes wrought by IT.  In particular,
these changes affect our capacity to select, search, screen, and connect.  As these abilities influence knowledge profiles and
community membership, they also influence the diversity and integration of the communities we voluntarily form.  Our findings
are suggestive of possible future scenarios and of paths dependent on the interactions we choose for ourselves.  In this context,
conditions set forth in our various propositions may help to guide the choices we might wish to make in light of such factors
as diversity, equality, and efficiency.
Figure 8.  Geography’s influence on near neighbors diminishes as other dimensions such as topic and
quality come to the fore.  Separation can increase with each new dimension
Under certain conditions, balkanization can be economically efficient and stable in the sense that no individual can be made
better off by changing their personal affiliations from those under focused interaction.  It might even be possible for this to be
welfare maximizing in the sense that balkanized organization produces the greatest output.  Perhaps the greatest production
is possible when the most efficient and like-minded producers collaborate.  For instance, interconnected “collaboraties” can
allow scientists to share data and access remote instruments (Wulf 1993).  Oceanographers who confer through communications
technology are more productive — they author more papers, earn greater peer recognition, and know more colleagues (Hesse
et al. 1993).  And, economists sometimes assert that matching peers is efficient (Kremer 1993; Roth 1984).
Voluntary balkanization, however, might also prove destructive to the overall welfare of society due to over-specialization.
The Black-Scholes equation for options pricing, for example, is derived from a physics equation for heat transfer (Black and
Scholes 1973, p. 644).  Reducing the spillovers between the fields of finance and physics could conceivably have forestalled
the development of options markets.  And unlike the example of the butcher, the baker, and the brewer, it was not clear
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This assumes that there is a “missing market” for cross-pollinating information since a third community could presumably15
subsidize any interaction which provided measurable benefits.  One information paradox, however, is that a potential buyer
cannot accurately assess the value of shared information without inspecting it, but having inspected it, the buyer cannot in good
faith return it to the seller and claim also to know nothing of what he has seen.  It therefore seems probable that both positive
externalities and missing markets exist which could lead to excessive balkanization and inefficiency.
The Firefly website at http://www.ffly.com provides a demonstration of several powerful filtering and searching16
technologies, including a collaborative filtering tool which recommends music based on a user’s past preferences and those
of his or her “neighbors” in music-space.
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beforehand that these were the groups that needed to share information.  The heat transfer equation had existed for more than
a century.14
Even in those cases where the connections are obvious, the necessary interactions may fail to occur.  If the returns to individuals
from balkanized interaction do not align with the returns to societies, then persons acting out of pure self-interest will not
internalize the spillover effects — the externalities — that would otherwise benefit society.  Voluntary balkanization might
then produce direct economic costs. For example, the benefits of knowledge produced by the “intellectual cross-pollination”
of having academic researchers interact with business practitioners might spill over into government policy — a positive
externality. These two groups will interact too infrequently, however, if they do not internalize the benefits they provide to
other groups. In such situations, reduced balkanization would be optimal from a purely economic perspective.15
Independent of the potential economic costs or benefits of balkanization, members of a society may wish to reduce
balkanization simply to maintain a degree of integration and societal cohesiveness.  With the customized access and search
capabilities of IT, individuals can focus their attention on career interests, music and entertainment that already match their
defined profiles, or they can read only news and analysis that align with their preferences.   Individuals empowered to screen16
out material that does not conform to their existing preferences may form virtual cliques, insulate themselves from opposing
points of view, and reinforce their biases.
Internet users can seek out interactions with like-minded individuals who have similar values, and thus become less likely to
trust important decisions to people whose values differ from their own.  This voluntary balkanization and the loss of shared
experiences and values may be harmful to the structure of democratic societies as well as decentralized organizations.
In addition, the stratification that results from balkanization along a quality dimension raises a concern for equality.  The gap
between the information rich and the information poor can widen with virtual communities (Alstyne and Brynjolfsson 1995).
If diversity of interaction or equality of resources represent goals we would ascribe to our social planners, we need to consider
what level of balkanization we deem most suitable for balancing our private interests as individuals and our shared interests
as members of a community.  Balkanization in one or more dimensions of our interactions may or may not be desirable, but
once achieved, it can be difficult to reverse. In any event, at this early stage of developing information infrastructure, no single
scenario is inevitable. We can, and should, explicitly consider what we value as we shape the nature of our networks and
infrastructure — with no illusions that a greater sense of community will inexorably result.
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APPENDIX A:  GLOSSARY OF VARIABLES
Var. Unit Interpretation
A Z Access:  The total number of individuals reachable in the population independent
of capacity C.
β R[0,1] Balkanized Affiliation:  Fragmentation of group membership.A
β R(0,1] Balkanized Communication:  Fragmentation of paths to information.C
β R[0,1] Balkanized Information:  Fragmentation of knowledge resources.I
C Z Channels:  A proxy for bounded rationality indicating the total number of possible
simultaneous connections.
i,j,k Z Individuals:  Members from the population whose size is N.
k R Knowledge:  An information resource owned by individual i of type t.it
k R Knowledge:  The total information of a given type or the sum of individuals’t
information along this dimension or
K R Knowledge:  The total information available to a population, given by K= [k , k ,T 1  2
..., k ].T
l Z Links:  The shortest communications distance between i and j.ij
M(t) Z Members:  The set of all individuals with access to type t information.
N Z Population size.
P R Profile:  A vector signifying the amount of information of each type available toi
T
individual i.  In isolation, this is Pi = [0, 0, ... k   ... 0].it
S R[0,1] Similarity:  The degree of overlap between information profiles, measured asij
Cos().
Θ R Theta:  The angle between the information profiles of i and j in knowledge space.ij
T Z Types:  The total number of information categories [1, 2, ... T]
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APPENDIX B
Proof of Proposition 1:  Without bounded rationality, C ³ N so every agent can connect to every knowledge base and œ i, j we
have that Pi = Pj = K thus || Pi - Pj || = 0 and Cos(Θ ) = 1.  Also, if every agent has access to all topics, then œ t, M(t) = {1, 2,ij
... N}, i.e., membership is the population.  Therefore β  = 1- (1/T)(1/T-1)(T)(T-1)(N /N ) = 0A
2 2
Proof of Proposition 2:  The number of connections of each type that an agent experiences is the composition of two
hypergeometric probability distributions.  Let t be the prevalence of a given type in a population of N when access provides
A samples.  Then the expected number of possible contacts to this type is given by:
The mean of this distribution is A (t/N).  If agents are indifferent to their connections or geography restricts their C choices
to near random samples from the set A, then the number of types t among their connections is another hypergeometric
probability distribution with C samples.  The mean of the composition is C(t/N).  Without loss of generality, we can simplify
our equations by assuming that each of the t types is equally probable and that the κ  are equal in magnitude to a constant κ.i
Since there are a total of T types, the likelihood of drawing a type t is (t/N) = (t/Tt)  (1/T).  The expected number of contacts
by type is thus (C/T).  Since agents reach their own knowledge bases with certainty, the expected knowledge profile of an agent
i is P  = [(C/T)κ , (C/T)κ , ... (1+C/T)κ ame community as i then P  P rly Cos(Θi  1  2 t, ... (C/T)κ ].  If j belongs to the s       =  and clea  T      i  j  ij
) = 1.  For i and j in different communities, we have Cos(Θ  ) =ij
After algebraic simplification, the κ’s cancel and this expression reduces to:
This expression has two attractive properties.  If C is large the index of shared profiles approaches 1 implying i and j have more
overlapping connections.  If the number of types T is large, the likelihood of having the same connections falls so the index
of shared profiles approaches 0.  In either case, however, the expression is positive for all finite values of C and T which
establishes the desired result prior to global access.  For β , note that initially the joint probability of neither agent participatingA
in the other’s community is (1-C/T)   but after global access this becomes 1.  Thus membership shrinks and β  falls.2 A
Proof of Proposition 3:  From Proposition 2, we know that under global access the initial knowledge profile of an agent i who
participates in a favored community is P  = [0, 0, ... Cκ , ... 0].  Let the new number of channels CN be given by C+∆.  Theni t
if agents use the new channels to connect to additional knowledge bases of the same type and deepen their specialty the new
knowledge profile becomes P  = [0, 0, ... (C+∆)κ , ... 0] and similarly for P  = [0, ... (C+∆)κ , ... 0, 0] with s … t.  But theni     t       j    s
Cos(Θ N) = Cos(Θ ) = 0 and since no community has added new members β N = β  indicating that the respective communitiesij   ij            A   A
are as just as balkanized as before.
2C + C2
2C + C 2 + T
2 C − X( )+ C − X( )2












Proof of Proposition 4:  Proposition 2 established that if agents are indifferent to their connections, the cosine of the angle
between their knowledge profiles is
where C is the number of channels and T is the number of types.  This is the measure of overlap if agents are comfortable
mixing with the population at large.  If, on the other hand, agents are not indifferent to their connections but prefer to allocate
X of their channels to a specific type then the expression for random association becomes
For all X, 1 # X # C this implies the overlap between profiles diminishes.  Note that if agents allocate all their channels to other
types X=C which leads again to complete balkanization, i.e. no overlap in knowledge profiles.  This establishes our contention
that the stronger are agent’s preferences the greater is the degree of balkanization.
Proof of Proposition 5:  For balkanization due to preferences, the proofs are identical to the proofs of Propositions 2 and 4
with T interpreted as grades in quality.  For balkanization due to veto power on the part of a destination community a detailed
proof is provided in the full version of (Alstyne and Brynjolfsson 1995).  Briefly, they argue that if agents’ opportunities for
association are ranked along a single dimension, associations among relative peer groups constitute a Nash equilibrium.  Agents
in the top tier first commit to pair with one another.  Then, having exhausted their options for contact, they become inaccessible
to the next tier.  The next tier becomes the most attractive set of partners and the exclusion process cascades.  No agent can
do better by altering their choices.  Quality constitutes the single dimension considered for Proposition 5.
Additional Measures of Balkanization
In this section, we present index alternatives that can move quasi-independently of those introduced in the body of the paper.
Depending on one’s assumptions, they typically move together.  Our initial indices measured similarity of knowledge profiles
and the diversity of affiliation among communities.  These two indices measure communication and resource concentration
respectively.  
Balkanized communication:  This index measures the fragmentation of channel paths or who talks to whom.  In a balkanized
community, agents communicate in clusters or possibly not at all.  In a fully integrated community, each agent communicates
with everyone.  For an index of balkanized communication, we require a measure that increases in the number of isolated
agents and that decreases each time agents establish a connection.  If agents are connected in a graph, let the communication
distance between two agents i and j be the total number of links l  on the shortest path between them.  Note that l  need notij          ij
equal l  if communication is directional or agents use different intermediaries.  Also, since agents do not need to connect toji
themselves, the least upper bound on a chain of connections among N agents is N-1. If no chain of connections exists between
i and j, define the distance to be N. 
Definition:  With these terms, we may define β  “index of balkanized communication” as:C
Thus β  0 (0, 1], approaching 0 (i.e., 1/N) as the population becomes large.  It reaches its lowest value when every agent isc
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If we wish to allow for the possibility of knowledge overlap, then type differences become set differences, e.g., |k  c k  -17 it  jt
(k  1 k )|.  Similar changes in other indices provide consistent results.it  jt
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Balkanized Resources:  The degree to which knowledge bases are concentrated can vary independently of whether specific
agents are directly connected, i.e., whether communication itself is balkanized.  A refusal to share, for example, would
balkanize information despite the existence of a channel whereas access via an alternate source would unbalkanize the same
resource.  For an index of balkanized information, we require the measure to increase as more resources become inaccessible
to any single agent and to increase also as the number of agents find the same resource inaccessible.
Definition:  Using our constructs for knowledge, we define the index of balkanized information β  to beI
This index ranges from 0 when the entire population has access to all of a society’s knowledge resources K to a maximum of
1 when a single agent has exclusive access to K.  Although we base this index on information shares, β  could equally well beI
used to measure other resource shares.
Shared Knowledge Index:  An alternative to S  is to compute the “distance” between knowledge profiles by applying a distanceij
metric to their difference.  This identifies how many of the knowledge bases agents share.
Definition:  The “distance” between two individuals in “knowledge space” is:
If both agents i and j have access to exactly the same knowledge bases  then this expression reduces to zero.17
A Note on Measures
The measures can, in fact, move independently.  Consider a completed table for Figure 5.
Index Figure 5.A Figure 5.B Figure 5.C
Average (S ) 0.69 0.44 0.25ij
βA 0.49 0.84 1
βC 0.28 0.28 0.78
βI 0.91 0.87 0.81
The table shows affiliation (β ) and communication (β ) become more balkanized but information resources (β ) do not.A    C        I
Under random association in 5.A, the information resources are more decentralized and thus more fragmented than they are
when collected into groups in 5.C so β  declines.  Note, however, that groups no longer overlap; there is no intergroupI
affiliation so β  rises.  Also, in the shift from 5.A to 5.B, the order of connections has changed but the total path length betweenA
agents has not so the communications index β  remains unchanged.C
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Another important observation is the tradeoff between complete range and sensitivity.  A measure cannot have both full range
(i.e. take on all values in 0#β#1) and also be sensitive to population size.  A population of twelve agents, for example, might
be considered completely integrated when all twelve are connected and so a balkanization index might obtain its lowest point,
here 0 (or integration 1).  But, there is a sense in which a fully integrated population of 120 is even more integrated than a fully
integrated population of twelve (connections are increasing arithmetically).  Thus one might prefer β(12) > β(120) for two fully
integrated communities.  But then, the index needs to account for arbitrary size populations and so 0<β#1 for any finite
population (i.e., its range is not closed and it cannot assume the value 0). As currently defined, certain of the indices do not
have full range.  They can be “tweaked” by changing certain coefficients and the range of summations to give the indices full
range.  For large populations, both formulations will be asymptotically the same.  For small populations, they can differ
substantially.  When working with fixed populations we suggest choosing a measure with full range, but when working with
varying populations we suggest choosing the more sensitive measure.
